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POLITICAL POSTURING OR A MOVE TOWARDS “NET
NATIONALISM?”: THE LEGALITY OF A TIKTOK BAN AND WHY
FOREIGN TECH COMPANIES SHOULD BE PAYING ATTENTION
Gabrielle Supak*
In July 2020, former President Trump issued an Executive Order
attempting to unilaterally ban TikTok, a social media platform used
mainly by teenagers to post videos of dances or viral challenges.
Banning a social media app is unprecedented in the United States
and raises various concerns among a wide variety of interested
parties. These concerns range from whether the President could
legally take such action to whether First Amendment rights were
violated to simply why even target a seemingly nonsensical social
media app. This Article attempts to answer these questions and
provides guidance to foreign tech companies that wish to continue
doing business in a United States that glaringly disapproves of any
company with ties to the government of the People’s Republic of
China.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 31, 2020, President Trump boldly proclaimed to
reporters aboard Air Force One that “[a]s far as TikTok is concerned
we’re banning them from the United States.”1 At first glance, many
may wonder why the President of the United States would want to
ban an app2 used primarily by teenagers and young adults.3 Going
back to 2018, TikTok was introduced as a popular video creating
1

Maggie Haberman (@maggieNYT), TWITTER (July 31, 2020, 10:29 PM),
https://twitter.com/maggieNYT/status/1289387767059775489 [https://perma.cc/
X8YT-QS5U].
2
“App” is short for application. An application is the same thing as a software
program. Apple popularized the term “app” with the creation of its “App Store”
in 2008. App, TECHTERMS (Sept. 22, 2012), https://techterms.com/definition/
app#:~:text=The%20term%20%22app%22%20was%20popularized,to%20refer
%20to%20mobile%20applications [https://perma.cc/DZ3E-E3Q9].
3
See Katie Sehl, 20 Important TikTok Stats Marketers Need to Know in 2020,
HOOTSUITE BLOG (May 7, 2020), https://blog.hootsuite.com/tiktok-stats/
[https://perma.cc/5N6C-BNLH].
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and sharing platform.4 By 2020, TikTok had over 800 million global
users and was the sixth most used social app in the world.5 TikTok’s
popularity led to unprecedented growth in the United States.6 For
example, in February 2019, there were 26,739,143 monthly active
users in the United States.7 By August 2020, 100 million Americans
were using TikTok, half of whom were considered daily users.8
However, the problem for President Trump was that TikTok is
owned by ByteDance, a Chinese tech company.9
On August 6, 2020, President Trump followed through on what
he told reporters aboard Air Force One.10 Trump issued an Executive
Order prohibiting “any transaction by any person, or with respect to
any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, with
ByteDance Ltd.”11 The President cited concerns that TikTok
threatened “the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the
United States.”12 Specifically, President Trump suggested that
TikTok’s “data collection threatens to allow the Chinese Communist
Party access to Americans’ personal and proprietary information—
potentially allowing China to track the locations of federal
employees and contractors, build dossiers of personal information

4

John Herrman, How TikTok is Rewriting the World, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/10/style/what-is-tik-tok.html?auth=linkedfacebook [https://perma.cc/P94M-D6YN].
5
Mansoor Iqbal, TikTok Revenue and Usage Statistics (2020), BUS. OF APPS (Oct.
15, 2020), https://www.businessofapps.com/data/tik-tok-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/
RK6H-DSZ5].
6
Complaint at 6, TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, No. 2:20-cv-7672 (C.D. Cal. 2020).
7
Id.
8
Id. at 6–7.
9
Bobby Allyn, Will TikTok Be Banned in The USA? It May Depend On Who
Owns It, NPR (July 23, 2020, 11:34 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/23/
894351718/will-tiktok-be-banned-in-the-usa-it-may-depend-on-whoownsit#:~:text=The%20Trump%20administration%20is%20considering,the%20
Chinese%20technology%20giant%20ByteDance [https://perma.cc/H26D-ZHYR].
10
Haberman, supra note 1; Bobby Allyn, Trump Signs Executive Order That
Will Effectively Ban Use of TikTok in the U.S., NPR (Aug. 6, 2020, 11:21 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/08/06/900019185/trump-signs-executive-order-thatwill-effectively-ban-use-of-tiktok-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/9JA5-C23H].
11
Exec. Order No. 13942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48637 (Aug. 6, 2020).
12
Id.
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for blackmail, and conduct corporate espionage.”13 TikTok quickly
responded to President Trump’s Executive Order and filed a lawsuit
on August 24, 2020.14 In this Executive Order challenge, TikTok
alleged that President Trump’s Executive Order went beyond his
presidential powers, along with many other constitutional
complaints.15
Despite the Executive Order’s unprecedented nature,16 banning
TikTok using the existing legal framework that regulates
international trade is a valid, albeit nontraditional, approach.
Therefore, foreign tech and app companies, especially those
perceived to be under the Chinese government’s influence, should
prepare for the age of “net nationalism”17 if they want to continue
doing business in the United States.18
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II examines the legal
framework in place that allows bans of foreign apps and other tech,
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, and the
Commerce Department’s Entity List. Part III looks at the First
Amendment implications of such a ban, including whether TikTok
has First Amendment protections, along with a counterargument
that legitimate government interests in protecting national security
outweigh any First Amendment interests TikTok may have. Finally,
Part IV argues that the ban implicates numerous international tech
concerns, including the rise of net nationalism, the creation of the
U.S. Clean Network, and what actions tech companies should take
to alleviate national security fears.
13

Id.
Complaint, supra note 6, at 1.
15
See generally id. TikTok alleged constitutional violations of the First
Amendment, due process protections of the Fifth Amendment, and a taking
without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
16
Banning TikTok is unprecedented because after extensive research, it appears
that a U.S. president has never unilaterally banned a mobile app like TikTok.
17
“Net Nationalism” is the idea of governments using the internet as a tool to
promote nationalistic policies and goals; thus, prioritizing the goals of one’s
country over the goals of a globally connected world. See Tim Wu, A Tik Tok Ban
is Overdue, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/18/
opinion/tiktok-wechat-ban-trump.html [https://perma.cc/G625-DWUW].
18
Id.
14
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In issuing the August 6th Executive Order, President Trump cited
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the National
Emergencies Act to support his authority to prohibit transactions
with ByteDance.19 The Executive Order also relied on findings from
a review conducted by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (“CFIUS”). However, there are other methods
President Trump could have used to accomplish this goal.
Alternatively, President Trump could have achieved a similar
outcome by solely relying on a CFIUS review or placing TikTok on
the U.S. Commerce Department’s Entity List.20 These three
executive branch options, beginning with the route President Trump
took, are discussed in detail below.
A. International Emergency Economic Powers Act
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(“IEEPA”)21 is an emergency statute located within the umbrella of
the National Emergencies Act (“NEA”).22 NEA was a response to a
committee study that aimed “to identify any states of national
emergency that were still in effect and to determine the universe of
federal statutes that bestow on the president special powers in such
situations.”23 NEA did not change what powers are granted to a
president during a national emergency.24 Instead, the statute created
a process for Congress to terminate a presidential emergency
declaration.25 IEEPA is one of approximately 475 statutes that grant

19

Exec. Order No. 13942, supra note 11.
Paige Leskin, No, Donald Trump Really Can’t ‘Ban’ TikTok, BUS. INSIDER
(Aug. 5, 2020, 8:47 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/can-trump-ban-tiktokno-legal-experts-cfius-alternative-options-2020-7 [https://perma.cc/BZE2-UDVB].
21
50 U.S.C. § 1702.
22
CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45618, THE
INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION,
AND USE 2 (2020).
23
James Wallner, The National Emergencies Act of 1976, LEGBRANCH.ORG
(Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.legbranch.org/the-national-emergencies-act-of-1976/
[https://perma.cc/U35Y-33TY].
24
Id.
25
Id.
20
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the president emergency powers following a national emergency
declaration.26
Invoking IEEPA allows the president “to investigate, regulate,
or prohibit foreign exchange transactions, transfers of credit,
transfers of securities, payments, and . . . take specified actions
relating to property in which a foreign country or person has
interest.”27 The President may “freez[e] assets, block[ ] property and
interests in property, prohibit[ ] U.S. persons from entering into
transactions related to frozen assets and blocked property, and in
some instances deny[ ] entry into the United States.”28
For the IEEPA provision to be triggered, the President must first
declare a national emergency or link the situation to a previously
declared national emergency.29 Here, President Trump linked
TikTok to the previously issued Executive Order 13873, Securing
the Information and Communications Technology and Services
Supply Chain.30 President Trump asserted that Executive Order
13873 was issued and created a national emergency because
Foreign adversaries are increasingly creating and exploiting
vulnerabilities in information and communications technology and
services, which store and communicate vast amounts of sensitive
information, facilitate the digital economy, and support critical
infrastructure and vital emergency services, in order to commit malicious
cyber-enabled actions, including economic and industrial espionage
against the United States and its people.31

Executive Order 13873 was initially issued to target foreign
telecommunications companies, including Chinese tech giants
Huawei and ZTE.32
26

Id.
CASEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 26.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Exec. Order No. 13873, 84 Fed. Reg. 22689 (May 15, 2019).
31
Id.
32
Eric Geller, Trump Signs Order Setting Stage to Ban Huawei from U.S.,
POLITICO (May 15, 2019, 7:05 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/15/
trump-ban-huawei-us-1042046 [https://perma.cc/B8XJ-2V3Y]. Huawei and
ZTE, like TikTok, were targeted because of security fears that they would enable
foreign adversaries to spy on the U.S. through the implementation of their 5G
networks. Id.
27
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IEEPA makes it possible to “deplatform” an app, which is one
of the most extreme routes the Trump administration could have
taken to ban TikTok.33 Although deplatforming has traditionally
been the “removal of one’s account for breaking platform rules,”34
the term would apply here because TikTok would be removed from
app stores that are not up to par with U.S. national security standards
as outlined in the Executive Order.35 By citing IEEPA, the TikTok
Executive Order can deplatform the app because “[i]f the act is
enforced, Americans would stop seeing TikTok in app stores and
would not be able to download software updates, eventually
rendering the social media app useless.”36
President Trump planned to begin to ban TikTok (along with
Chinese app WeChat) on Sunday, September 20, 2020, and intended
to later widen restrictions on November 12, 2020.37 Initially, the
proposed ban would have meant users could not download or update
the app.38 However, the later widened restrictions would have
prohibited any transaction involving internet hosting, content
delivery network services, directly contracted or arranged internet
transit or peering services, and any utilization of TikTok’s mobile

33

Adi Robertson, How the Trump Administration Could ‘Ban’ TikTok, THE
VERGE (Aug. 1, 2020, 12:12 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/7/9/
21315983/trump-pompeo-ban-tiktok-bytedance-chinese-social-media-nationalsecurity-censorship-methods [https://perma.cc/8A2N-99AC].
34
Richard Rogers, Deplatforming: Following Extreme Internet Celebrities to
Telegram and Alternative Social Media, European Journal of Communication, 35
EUR. J. OF COMMC’N 213, 214 (2020) (discussing how extreme internet celebrities
such as Alex Jones and Milo Yiannopoulos have been removed from major social
media platforms for engaging in dangerous, extreme speech).
35
Exec. Order No. 13942, supra note 11.
36
Trump Signs Executive Order Essentially Banning U.S. Companies from
Working with TikTok, FIRST AMENDMENT WATCH AT NYU (Aug. 7, 2020),
https://firstamendmentwatch.org/trump-signs-executive-order-essentiallybanning-u-s-companies-from-working-with-tiktok/ [https://perma.cc/VHS5-26LZ].
37
Ana Swanson et al., Trump Administration to Ban TikTok and WeChat From
U.S. App Stores, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2020, 1:47 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/09/18/business/trump-tik-tok-wechat-ban.html [https://perma.cc/B32F-S7NJ].
38
Id.
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app constituent code, or software.39 The proposed deplatforming on
this scale by the federal government’s executive branch should
concern any company, foreign or not, that wishes to conduct
business in the United States.
Luckily for TikTok and its then 100 million American users, an
injunction was issued halting the ban from going into effect after a
rare Sunday emergency hearing.40 This injunction was a win for
ByteDance, which was still negotiating the sale of TikTok to Oracle
and Walmart.41 The Trump Administration set December 4, 2020, as
the deadline for negotiations.42 However, the deadline quietly
passed and was not extended.43 At the time, anonymous sources with
knowledge of the matter reported that the U.S. government would
not enforce the deadline because the negotiations were ongoing, and
the U.S. government was “highly motivated” to reach a resolution.44
On December 14, 2020, a panel of judges heard oral arguments
concerning the Trump Administration’s appeal to reinstate the ban

39
Identification of Prohibited Transactions To Implement Executive Order
13942, 85 Fed. Reg. 60061, 60062 (Sept. 24, 2020) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R.
pt. VII).
40
Rachel Lerman, Judge Blocks TikTok Ban in Second Ruling Against Trump’s
Efforts to Curb Popular Chinese Services, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2020, 9:54 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/09/27/tiktok-ban-injunction/
[https://perma.cc/S35H-CFA2].
41
Vanessa Pappas, An Update for Our TikTok Family, TIKTOK (Sept. 19, 2020),
https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/an-update-for-our-tiktok-family [https://perma.cc/
98HT-ACBN]. Oracle planned to serve as TikTok’s trusted cloud and technology
provider responsible for securing user data. Id. Oracle and Walmart would be able
to take up to a twenty percent cumulative stake in the company following a
TikTok Global pre-IPO financing round. Id.
42
Jay Peters, The US Government Will Let TikTok Run Out the Clock and
‘Overlook’ Its Own Deadline, THE VERGE (Dec. 4, 2020, 9:02 PM), https://
www.theverge.com/2020/12/4/22154801/us-government-tiktok-ban-deadlinebytedance-trump-administration-cfius [https://perma.cc/L3BJ-JYQJ].
43
Id.
44
Id. But see Molly Schuetz, TikTok sale to Walmart, Oracle Shelved amid Biden
Review: WSJ, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/tiktoksale-to-walmart-oracle-shelved-amid-biden-review-wsj-1.1561756
[https://
perma.cc/MHK3-TUDK] (reporting that TikTok’s sale to Oracle and Walmart has
been put on hold pending a review by the Biden Administration).
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if the sale was not completed.45 Both the district court injunction
opinion and the appellate panel of judges46 expressed that Trump
may have overstepped his authority under IEEPA because of the
Personal Communication Limitation47 and Informational Materials
Amendment Limitation.48
1. The Informational Materials Amendment Limitation
The Informational Materials Amendment or “Berman
Amendment”49 excludes “information or informational materials”
from IEEPA coverage, including but not limited to publications,
films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms,
microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks, and news
wire feeds, provided such exchange is not otherwise controlled for
national security or foreign policy reasons.”50 In 1993, the Freedom
45

David Yaffe-Bellany, TikTok Appellate Judges Signal Skepticism of Trump’s
Ban on App, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 14, 2020, 11:37 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2020-12-14/tiktok-appeals-court-judges-appear-skeptical-of-trump-banon-app [https://perma.cc/MG29-MPZD].
46
Oral Argument at 23:50, TikTok, Inc. v. Trump, No. 20-5302 (D.C. Cir. Dec.
14, 2020), https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings2020.nsf/31F18260
5F720B498525863E0064C310/$file/20-5302.mp3 [https://perma.cc/E99B-SARR].
U.S. Circuit Judge Judith Rogers rebuked the government’s justification for the
ban under the Information Materials Amendment, openly telling the government
attorney that “Congress wrote this language, it seems to just fly in the face of
that.” Id.
47
50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(1) (stating that IEEPA’s granting of executive authority
does not include the “authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly . . .
any . . . personal communication, which does not involve the transfer of anything
of value.”). This provision is not explicitly discussed in this paper, however, there
are arguments that users on TikTok exchange their data for the ability to use
TikTok, which would qualify as a transfer of something of value. If this is the
case, then the executive branch is not barred from banning TikTok under IEEPA.
48
Memorandum Opinion in Support of Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, TikTok Inc. v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-02658, at 9 (D.D.C.
Sept. 27, 2017); Yaffe-Bellany, supra note 45.
49
138 CONG. REC. 15,052 (1992). Rep. Howard L. Berman was an advocate of
the Informational Materials Amendment and testified to Congress that “[t]he fact
that we disapprove of the government of a particular country ought not to inhibit
our dialog [sic] with the people who suffer under those governments . . . . We are
strongest and most influential when we embody the freedoms to which others
aspire.” Id.
50
CASEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 12.
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to Trade in Ideas Act clarified that information was covered
“regardless of format or medium of transmission.”51 TikTok’s code
would, presumably, be covered by the Information Materials
Amendment under this definition. The U.S. District Court for
Washington, D.C. determined TikTok’s content qualified as
informational materials by comparing it to a news wire that is a
channel for different types of informational materials.52
Although this Amendment does not explicitly cover digital
social media apps, it would be a logical extension of the Amendment
considering the similarity between the functions of TikTok
compared to what is already covered. The list of covered
informational materials includes the phrase “including but not
limited to,” which indicates the list is meant to be illustrative and
not finite.53 At the time the Amendment was enacted, compact discs
were considered a new technology for information storage.54 Social
media apps, like TikTok, are just a form of new technology used to
store informational materials; therefore, just like compact discs,
apps fall under the statute’s protection. The fact that TikTok is a
digital app is immaterial to this analysis because the Freedom to
Trade in Ideas Act clarified that the format or medium of
transmission does not affect coverage.55
The U.S. government argues that the ban does not run afoul of
the Informational Materials Amendment because it claims the
proposed ban only regulates business-to-business economic
transactions and does not prohibit importing or exporting tangible
or intangible informational materials.56 The government chooses to
differentiate TikTok from the listed examples given in the
51

See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub.
L. No. 103-236, § 525, 108 Stat. 382, 474 (1994).
52
Memorandum Opinion, supra note 48, at 11.
53
Jarred O. Taylor III, Information Wants to be Free (of Sanctions): Why the
President Cannot Prohibit Foreign Access to Social Media Under U.S. Export
Regulations, 54 W.M. & MARY L. REV. 297, 307 (2012).
54
Id. at 308.
55
See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub.
L. No. 103-236, § 525, 108 Stat. 382, 474 (1994).
56
Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction, at 17, TikTok Inc. v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-2658 2020 WL
5763634 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2020).
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Informational Materials Amendment because TikTok’s terms of
service describe it as a “diverse set of services, that (among other
things) manipulates, collects, processes, transmits, brokers, and sells
information.”57
However, the government’s terms of service characterization
will not suffice to exempt TikTok from being covered by the
Informational Materials Amendment because TikTok’s central
feature is information sharing in the form of short videos.58 In
contrast, a possible, perhaps even successful argument, for the
government, would be to focus on how TikTok users are not using
the platform for “free” because users agree to let TikTok collect their
valuable data.59 Therefore, TikTok’s business model could be
characterized as a transaction for a service.60 If the government took
this approach, it is more likely that the Informational Materials
Amendment will not protect TikTok because the platform would
more closely resemble an economic transaction than the free flow of
information. As the government explains, it would be contradictory
if Congress gave the President the power to block transactions
deemed legitimate national security threats yet allowed those same

57

Id.
Paige Leskin, Inside the Rise of TikTok, the Viral Video-Sharing App Wildly
Popular With Teens and Loathed By the Trump Administration, BUS. INSIDER,
(Aug. 7, 2020, 5:20 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/tiktok-app-onlinewebsite-video-sharing-2019-7 [https://perma.cc/2FY5-5CVP].
59
TERMS OF SERVICE, TIKTOK https://www.tiktok.com/legal/terms-ofuse?lang=en [https://perma.cc/63HMLXRN] (last updated Feb. 2019) (“We
automatically collect certain information from you when you use the Platform,
including internet or other network activity information such as your IP address,
geolocation-related data (as described below), unique device identifiers, browsing
and search history (including content you have viewed in the Platform), and
Cookies (as defined below).”).
60
Id.; Justin Sherman, Unpacking TikTok, Mobile Apps and National Security
Risks, LAWFARE, (Thursday, Apr. 2, 2020, 10:06 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
unpacking-tiktok-mobile-apps-and-national-security-risks [https://perma.cc/APY3K3RL] (“It notes further that ‘[w]e also collect information you share with us
from third-party social network providers, and technical and behavioral
information about your use of the Platform,’ such as, potentially, contact lists on
other social media services.”).
58
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companies to bypass the executive block by ensuring at least part of
its business deals with informational materials.61
2. National Security Exemption from Compliance
Even if the government’s above arguments failed, the
Informational Materials Amendment would not apply if the
exchange is controlled for national security reasons, including
weapons proliferation, international terrorism, and espionage.62
Although the Trump Administration has claimed national security
concerns with TikTok,63 it is unclear whether these concerns rise to
the level of exemption from the IEEPA Informational Materials
Amendment. The espionage exemption is particularly relevant here
because the TikTok Executive Order alleges that the Chinese
government is using, or could use, TikTok for espionage purposes.64
In a partially redacted Commerce Department memo, government
officials explicitly laid out some of these national security
concerns.65 The memo highlighted the FBI’s determination that
Chinese “intelligence and economic espionage presents the greatest
long-term threat to U.S. national security and economic security.”66
The memo further claimed that the “bulk” data collection practices
that China engages in “is a tactic used by the Chinese government
to further its intelligence-gathering and to understand more about
who to target for espionage, whether electronically or via human
61

Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 56, at 18–19. However, it is important
to note, the national security threat must be real. A president should not be able to
use the national security exemption to block any transaction under the guise of
national security.
62
50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3).
63
See Exec. Order No. 13942, supra note 11.
64
Id. (explaining that TikTok’s “data collection threatens to allow the Chinese
Communist Party access to Americans’ personal and proprietary information—
potentially allowing China to track the locations of Federal employees and
contractors, build dossiers of personal information for blackmail, and conduct
corporate espionage”).
65
U.S. Dep’t of Com., Memorandum for the Secretary on the Proposed Prohibited
Transactions Related to TikTok Pursuant to Executive Order 13942 (Sept. 17, 2020), as
reprinted in Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction Exhibit 1, TikTok Inc. v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-02658,
(D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2020).
66
Id. at 5.
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recruitment.”67 The Commerce Department also discussed how the
Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) requires party members to be
employed by private or non-governmental Chinese organizations.68
Most alarmingly, the Commerce Department claimed that Chinese
law requires companies subject to its jurisdiction, such as
ByteDance, to assist with surveillance and intelligence efforts if
requested to do so.69
In its injunction opinion, the U.S. District Court for Washington,
D.C. considered the government’s espionage argument but called it
novel because the relevant espionage section of the U.S. Code
“authorizes life imprisonment or the death penalty for those who
share U.S. defense secrets . . . with foreign adversaries.”70 The court
further determined, “it is not plausible that the films, photos, art, or
even personal information U.S. users share on TikTok fall within
the plain meaning of the Espionage Act.”71
The government’s espionage argument, however, requires a
further analysis of the Espionage Act. The Espionage Act generally
seeks to punish those who undermine the “national defense.”72 The
Supreme Court of the United States construed the term “national
defense” as “a generic concept of broad connotations, referring to
the military and naval establishments and the related activities of
national preparedness.”73 Here, President Trump identified Chinese
67

Id. at 6.
Id. at 7. In 2017, seventy percent of private owned companies in China had
CCP committees within the organization, including ByteDance. Id.
69
Id. at 9. China’s National Security Law requires that “[a]ny organization or
citizen shall support, assist and cooperate with the state intelligence work in
accordance with the law.” National Security Law of the People’s Republic of
China Art. 7. The law goes on that state “intelligence work organs, when legally
carrying forth intelligence work, may demand that concerned organs,
organizations, or citizens provide needed support, assistance, and cooperation.”
Id. at Art. 14. See also Daniel Wagner, The Global Implications of China’s
National and Cyber Security Laws, DIPLOMATIC COURIER (Aug. 7, 2020),
https://www.diplomaticourier.com/posts/the-global-implications-of-chinasnational-and-cyber-security-laws [https://perma.cc/GY6M-LSAW].
70
Memorandum Opinion, supra note 48, at 13.
71
Id.
72
18 U.S.C. § 793.
73
Gorin v. U.S., 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941) (adopting the U.S. Government’s
definition of “national security”).
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cyber espionage as a threat to the national defense, and thus, banning
TikTok because of its compromised position could be considered a
related activity of national preparedness. This achieves the purpose
of national preparedness because IEEPA can be used to “block and
prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property” of
people and companies who “engage[ ] in, support[ ], facilitate[ ], or
benefit[ ] from the significant appropriation, through economic or
industrial espionage in cyberspace, of technologies or proprietary
information developed by United States persons.”74 Therefore, if the
espionage threat was legitimate, then use of IEEPA was proper.
B. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
Alternatively, Trump could have solely relied on CFIUS review
to “ban” TikTok. In fact, this was the route many experts believed
the Trump administration would take.75 CFIUS “is an interagency
committee with authority to review, block, and where necessary
compel divestment of foreign acquisitions of U.S. businesses.”76 The
Secretary of the Treasury chairs CFIUS, and additional members
“include the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Commerce,
Defense, State, Energy, and Labor, the Attorney General, the
Director of National Intelligence, the U.S. Trade Representative,
and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.”77
CFIUS was initially authorized to act pursuant to Section 721 of
the Defense Production Act of 1950, also known as the Exon-Florio
amendment.78 Section 721 has since been revised, first by the
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (“FINSA”)
74

50 U.S.C. § 1708(b)(1), (2).
See Leskin, supra note 20.
76
Geoffrey Gertz, Why is the Trump Administration Banning TikTok and
WeChat?, BROOKINGS (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2020/08/07/why-is-the-trump-administration-banning-tiktok-and-wechat/
[https://perma.cc/U8T5-6WL3].
77
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, OVERVIEW OF THE CFIUS PROCESS 1 (2017),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/overview-CFIUS-process [https://perma.cc/
YC89-RK9F].
78
CFIUS Laws and Guidance, DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/
policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-unitedstates-cfius/cfius-laws-and-guidance [https://perma.cc/Q3Q7-74GL] (last visited
Jan. 12, 2021).
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and later the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of
2018 (“FIRRMA”).79 At its inception, CFIUS was only allowed to
review transactions that could result in foreign control of a U.S.
business.80 FIRRMA expanded the jurisdiction of CFIUS to include
“non-controlling investments in U.S. businesses that produce,
design, test, manufacture, fabricate, or develop one or more critical
technologies;81 own, operate, manufacture, supply, or service critical
infrastructure;82 or maintain or collect sensitive personal data of U.S.
citizens that may be exploited in a manner that threatens national
security.”83 In this context, “sensitive personal data” is defined as
including:
[T]en categories of data maintained or collected by U.S. businesses that
(i) target or tailor products or services to certain populations, including
U.S. military members and employees of federal agencies with national
security responsibilities, (ii) collect or maintain such data on at least one
million individuals, or (iii) have a demonstrated business objective to
maintain or collect such data on greater than one million individuals and
such data is an integrated part of the U.S. business’s primary products or
services. The categories of data include types of financial, geolocation,
and health data, among others.84

When reviewing foreign acquisitions or non-controlling covered
investments85 in U.S. businesses, the role of CFIUS is to evaluate
79

Id.; 50 U.S.C. § 4565.
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FACT SHEET: FINAL CFIUS REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING FIRRMA 3 (Jan. 13, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/
206/Final-FIRRMA-Regulations-FACT-SHEET.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GFL-YBND].
81
“CFIUS may review certain transactions involving U.S. businesses that
produce, design, test, manufacture, fabricate, or develop one or more critical
technologies. ‘Critical technologies’ is defined to include certain items subject to
export controls and other existing regulatory schemes, as well as emerging and
foundational technologies controlled pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act
of 2018.” Id.
82
“CFIUS may review certain transactions involving U.S. businesses that
perform specified functions—owning, operating, manufacturing, supplying, or
servicing—with respect to critical infrastructure across subsectors such as
telecommunications, utilities, energy, and transportation, each as identified in an
appendix to the regulations.” Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Non-controlling covered investments include those that that afford a foreign
person certain access, rights, or involvement in certain types of U.S. businesses.
Id. at 2.
80
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whether there is a genuine national security risk and, if so, the extent
of the risk.86 If CFIUS finds a national security risk, a company may
be able to mitigate such risk.87 However, if the security risk cannot
be mitigated, the foreign company would be prohibited from
purchasing or investing in the American company.88 If, after review,
CFIUS recommends suspension or prohibition of the transaction, it
is then referred to the President for a final determination.89 The
President is then required to make two findings to act on the
recommendation. First, the President must find that “there is
credible evidence that leads the President to believe that the foreign
interest exercising control might take action that threatens to impair
the national security.”90 Second, the President must find “that
provisions of law, other than section 721 and [IEEPA], do not, in
the judgment of the President, provide adequate and appropriate
authority for the President to protect the national security.”91
In 2019, after bipartisan requests,92 CFIUS began investigating
ByteDance’s one billion dollar acquisition of U.S. company,
Musical.ly, which “was fully rebranded as TikTok in 2018.”93
Although the acquisition was completed two years before the review
86

Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,567,
74,568 (Dec. 8, 2008); LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra note 77, at 2.
87
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra note 77, at 6.
88
Id.
89
Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,567,
74,569 (Dec. 8, 2008).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
See Press Release, Chuck Schumer, Senate Minority Leader & Tom Cotton,
Senator, Request Assessment of National Security Risks Posed by China-Owned
Video-Sharing Platform, TikTok, A Potential Counterintelligence Threat With
Over 110 Million Downloads in U.S., Alone (Oct. 24, 2019), https://
www.democrats.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/leader-schumer-senatorcotton-request-assessment-of-national-security-risks-posed-by-china-ownedvideo-sharing-platform-tiktok-a-potential-counterintelligence-threat-with-over110-million-downloads-in-us-alone [https://perma.cc/HLD3-3LSY].
93
Haley Samsel, U.S. Government Opens Official National Security Investigation
Into TikTok, SEC. TODAY (Nov. 4, 2019), https://securitytoday.com/articles/
2019/11/04/tiktok-national-security-investigation.aspx [https://perma.cc/VV4R-PH5Q].
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began, TikTok did not notify CFIUS when it acquired Musical.ly,
which is why CFIUS could retrospectively investigate the deal.94
TikTok claims it tried to cooperate with CFIUS once the
investigation was opened.95 Nevertheless, according to TikTok,
“CFIUS never articulated any reason why TikTok’s security
measures were inadequate to address any national security
concerns,”96 and “[d]espite these repeated efforts and concrete
proposals to alleviate any national security concerns, the agency
record reflects that CFIUS repeatedly refused to engage with
ByteDance and its counsel about CFIUS’s concerns.”97 TikTok
noted that just minutes before midnight on the final day of the
statutory review period, “the Committee issued a letter stating that
‘CFIUS has identified national security risks arising from the
Transaction and that it has not identified mitigation measures that
would address those risks.’”98
In exercising executive power under IEEPA, President Trump
relied on CFIUS’ conclusion to issue an additional Executive Order
requiring ByteDance to sell TikTok and that it do so under CFIUS’
conditions.99 Using CFIUS in this way is an extraordinary move
because CFIUS reviews typically concern industries directly related
to national security, such as infrastructure or telecommunications,
not consumer tech companies like TikTok.100 In 2019 alone, CFIUS
conducted a review of 231 covered transactions and further

94
Greg Roumeliotis, et al., Exclusive: U.S. Opens National Security
Investigation into TikTok – Sources, REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2019, 11:21 AM)
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tiktok-cfius-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-opensnational-security-investigation-into-tiktok-sources-idUSKBN1XB4IL [https://perma.
cc/RDY2-G86Z].
95
Complaint, supra note 6, at 14.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 15.
99
Exec. Order Regarding the Acquisition of Musical.ly by Byte Dance Ltd., 85
Fed. Reg. 51,297, 51,297–98 (Aug. 14, 2020).
100
Martin Chorzempa, The TikTok Deal is a Defining Moment for CFIUS,
BARRON’S (Sept. 17, 2020, 9:54 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/thetiktok-deal-is-a-defining-moment-for-cfius-51600350898 [https://perma.cc/F33UKWTN].
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investigated 113.101 A review of historical data concerning CFIUS
reviews reveals that in 2019, CFIUS scrutinized deals at a rate of
five times more than in the previous decade.102 In short, one thing
should be clear to international tech companies about CFIUS: “[the]
committee considers personal data a serious national security issue.
It can and will block or unwind tech deals that give foreign access
to Americans’ personal information.”103
C. Entity List
A third possible executive branch route for banning TikTok is
the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Entity List or the “blacklist of
foreign companies.”104 The Entity List is “a regulatory tool
administered by the Commerce Department to protect U.S. national
security and foreign-policy interests by restricting U.S. exports to a
listed entity.”105 Companies on the entity list are restricted from
receiving certain exports that were manufactured or designed in the
United States.106 After being placed on the list, the Export
Administration Regulations “impose[ ] additional license
requirements on, and limits the availability of most license
exceptions for exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) to,
listed entities.”107 The license required to export to the entity is
101

COMM. ON FOREIGN INVEST. IN THE U.S., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2
(2019), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUS-Public-Annual-Report-CY2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LX5-8XAS].
102
Chorzempa, supra note 100.
103
Dan Mogin & Jennifer M. Oliver, POTUS Uses CFIUS to Unwind TikTok
Deal, Fears Chinese Government Will Get Americans’ Private Data, NAT’L L.
REV. (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/potus-uses-cfius-tounwind-tiktok-deal-fears-chinese-government-will-get-americans [https://perma.cc/
XAQ6-ZCDT].
104
Leskin, supra note 20.
105
Beau Barnes, et al., Trump Can’t Ban TikTok but He Can Hurt It, FOREIGN
POL’Y (July 24, 2020, 5:01 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/24/trumpcant-ban-tiktok-free-chinese-apps/ [https://perma.cc/MY3Q-KJW8].
106
Mengqi Sun, U.S. Increasingly Uses Trade Blacklist for Foreign Policy
Goals, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2020, 6:22 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
u-s-increasingly-uses-trade-blacklist-for-foreign-policy-goals-11598912568?
mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=7 [https://perma.cc/UXB2-CMCC].
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Addition of Entities to the Entity List, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,961, 22,961 (May 21,
2019) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 744).
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subject to review with a presumption of denial.108 Therefore, once
placed on the list, it is challenging for foreign companies to receive
any U.S. exports. Multiple Chinese tech companies are already on
the list, including Huawei and many of its affiliates.109
For example, the Commerce Department added Huawei to the
list in May of 2019 because it determined that Huawei was engaging
in practices that undermined national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States.110 The main consequence of the
placement of Huawei on the list is that they will not be able to
purchase semiconductors, including chips that are the essential
components of mobile phones, that have been developed or created
with U.S. software or technology.111 Before being placed on the
Entity List, Huawei and its chief financial officer were indicted by
the U.S. Department of Justice for various fraud crimes and IEEPA
violations because they had supplied Iran with American goods in
violation of trade sanctions.112 Further, the U.S. government’s
concerns center on how intertwined Huawei is with the Chinese
government.113 For example, the Central Intelligence Agency
(“CIA”) flagged that Huawei receives funding from China’s
108

Id.
David Shepardson & Karen Freifeld, China’s Huawei, 70 Affiliates Placed
on U.S. Trade Blacklist, REUTERS (May 15, 2019, 6:14 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-china-huaweitech/chinas-huawei-70-affiliates-placed-on-us-tradeblacklist-idUSKCN1SL2W4 [https://perma.cc/LZ37-4AAN].
110
15 C.F.R. § 744 (2019) (illustrating that Huawei has been indicted in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York on violations of the
IEEPA “by . . . causing the export, reexport, sale and supply, directly and
indirectly, of goods, technology and services (banking and other financial
services) from the United States to Iran and the government of Iran without
obtaining a license”).
111
David Shepardson, U.S. Tightening Restrictions on Huawei Access to
Technology, Chips, REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2020, 7:33 AM) https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-huawei-tech/u-s-tightening-restrictions-on-huawei-access-to-technologychips-idUSKCN25D1CC [https://perma.cc/4SQ3-N8VU].
112
Superseding Indictment at 10–19, United States v. Huawei Tech. Co., Cr.
No. 18-457 (S-2) (AMD) (2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/
1125021/download [https://perma.cc/5SXS-R8AQ].
113
Steven Musil, CIA Reportedly Says Huawei Funded by Chinese State
Security, CNET (Apr. 21, 2019, 8:25 AM PT), https://www.cnet.com/news/ciareportedly-says-huawei-funded-by-chinese-state-security/ [https://perma.cc/UZ2PGGTX].
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National Security Commission, the People’s Liberation Army, and
another unnamed part of the Chinese state intelligence network.114
The placement of Huawei on the list is primarily due to the
perceived risk that Huawei would grant Chinese authorities access
to sensitive American user data.115
Before the Trump Administration, the Entity List had been “used
to target violations of U.S. export control or economic sanctions
laws, but in recent years, the scope of ‘national security’ has
expanded.”116 Therefore, “[i]t would not be a stretch for the United
States to pronounce that ByteDance’s access to the personal data of
U.S. citizens threatens U.S. national security interests,”117 which is
exactly what Trump did in his first Executive Order concerning
TikTok.118
Overall, the current legal framework is adequate to allow the
executive branch to regulate and ban any foreign company it deems
a national security risk. Companies must be wary of this when
conducting their business with the U.S. and be aware of the
consequences of being deemed a “national security threat.”
Additionally, although deference to national security concerns may
be appropriate, it must be ensured that those concerns are legitimate
and not just perceived. In sum, the United States is serious about
protecting American data and privacy from peering foreign eyes and
is not afraid to take dramatic steps to protect that interest.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF A BAN ON FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Although there are multiple methods the executive branch can
use to attempt to “ban” TikTok, these methods may not pass
constitutional muster because they potentially implicate First
Amendment freedoms.119 Cyberspace and social media, in
particular, have become the “quintessential forum for the exercise
of First Amendment right[s].”120 However, the Supreme Court has
114
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not directly addressed how governmental regulation of modern
social media fits into the First Amendment framework.121 Here, First
Amendment questions arise because TikTok is a “widely-used
platform for U.S. entities and individuals to engage in
self-expression—including political expression—and to share
original content.”122 Other IEEPA bans have not targeted any other
company similarly engaged in free expression.123 In the litigation
surrounding the ban, TikTok claimed that it has First Amendment
protections via the rights of creators on TikTok, and in TikTok’s
source code or software, while the U.S. government countered that
there is no First Amendment implication at all.124 This section
addresses the First Amendment rights of content creators, platform
owners’ rights in their source code, and whether national security
sufficiently outweighs those rights.
A. First Amendment Rights of TikTok Content Creators and Users
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed the
medium of social media in the context of the First Amendment, it is
likely that content creators125 have First Amendment protections in
the content they create, so long as that content would not be exempt
from protection under a separate First Amendment doctrine, such as
obscenity.126 Concurring in Kovacs v. Cooper,127 Justice Jackson
wrote, “[t]he moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the
handbill, the sound truck and the street corner orator have differing
natures, values, abuses and dangers. Each, in my view, is a law unto
121
VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45650, FREE SPEECH AND THE
REGULATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT 40 (Mar. 27, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/R45650.pdf [https://perma.cc/53P7-VN93].
122
Elena Chachko, Could the TikTok and WeChat Executive Orders Undermine
IEEPA?, LAWFARE (Aug. 8, 2020, 2:49 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
could-tiktok-and-wechat-executive-orders-undermine-ieepa [https://perma.cc/WST5T4HJ].
123
Id.
124
Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 56, at 29.
125
TikTok itself is a content creator. The company’s account, @tiktok, creates
posts that relate to topics and interests that the company cares about. Supplemental
Declaration of Vanessa Papas at 2, TikTok Inc. v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-02658 (2020).
126
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
127
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 77 (1949).
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itself.”128 The same is certainly true about social media, and
application of the First Amendment will account for the uniqueness
of the medium. Social media is unique, compared to other more
traditional mediums of expression, because of the immediacy of
posting, interactivity among users, and broad accessibility, all
without the editorial filters to which traditional media, such as
newspapers and broadcast journalism, are subject.129
1. Content-Based Restrictions
Assuming that content creation on TikTok falls within speech
that is protected by the First Amendment, the next determination is
whether such a ban is content-based or content-neutral. If a
regulation of speech is content-based,130 the Court must balance
constitutional interests and the regulatory interests against strict
scrutiny.131 The higher the value of the speech, the stronger the
constitutional interest is.132 Many consider pure political speech as
the most high-valued form of speech, and any regulation of it would
be subject to strict scrutiny.133 Strict scrutiny requires the
government to prove that the proposed ban is “narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling Government interest.”134 Here, the compelling
government interest is protecting national security.135
Content-based restrictions are also subject to prior restraint
analysis.136 A prior restraint “is a restriction on speech that is
imposed prior to the dissemination of a communication.”137 The
Supreme Court has expressed that “[a]ny system of prior restraints
of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption

128
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against its constitutional validity.”138 Therefore, the government
“carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition
of such a restraint.”139 There is a small exception for expression that
causes an immediate threat to national security.140 However, the
burden is still on the government to prove that national security is
threatened.141
TikTok and its users believe the ban is a content-based
restriction and a prior restraint because the platform is used for
political speech142 and disseminating pro-Chinese government
content,143 which was contrary to the Trump Administration’s
goals.144 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania did not find this argument persuasive in evaluating the
first round of prohibitions on TikTok because “pre-existing users”
of TikTok145 “will continue to be able to share their content and
communicate on the application,” despite TikTok’s impending
removal from app stores.146 The court also found that the prohibition

138

Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). See also Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
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to disseminate political speech).
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Muslim minorities.” Exec. Order No. 13942, supra note 11. This mobile
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on TikTok made “no distinction between favored and disfavored
content,” therefore, the ban is not a content-based restriction.147
However, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania left the question
open about whether the later impending restrictions on TikTok
would be in line with the requirements of the First Amendment
because of the Northern District of California’s decision in U.S.
WeChat Users All. v. Trump.148 In that case, a group of WeChat users
successfully moved for an injunction to halt an Executive Order
which would also effectively ban WeChat in the United States.
Chinese tech company Tencent owns WeChat and originally began
as a messaging service but has transformed into a “super app” with
integrated games, banking, ride-hailing, and meal delivery
services.149 WeChat is the predominant social media app in China
because the Chinese government blocks western apps like
Facebook.150 The Northern District of California decided that the
WeChat users would likely succeed on the merits of their First
Amendment challenge to an outright ban of WeChat. The court
came to this conclusion because “evidence demonstrated that
‘WeChat is effectively the only means of communication for many’
in the Chinese-speaking and Chinese-American community, and
‘there are no viable substitute platforms or apps’” to communicate
with those located in China.151 In comparison, TikTok is not used as
the sole line of communication among people in different countries,
and there is a multitude of other apps available that provide similar
functions.152
147
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2. Content-Neutral Restrictions
An outright ban of TikTok appears to be content-neutral rather
than content-based and would have to pass only intermediate
scrutiny compared to the more stringent strict scrutiny review.153 “A
content-neutral, time-place-or-manner restriction survives
intermediate scrutiny if it (1) is narrowly tailored, (2) serves a
significant government interest unrelated to the content of the speech,
and (3) leaves open adequate channels for communication.”154
Protecting national security is a significant government interest, and
banning TikTok arguably would leave open other adequate channels
for communication given the vast number of social media apps
available, some of which have rolled out features similar to
TikTok’s.155 Whether a complete ban is narrowly tailored poses a
different question and turns directly upon how exactly TikTok
threatens national security.
B. First Amendment Rights of Platform Owners in their Source Code
TikTok is a mobile software app, and the underlying code could
be covered as speech under the First Amendment.156 Although the
Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether the First Amendment
protects software, the Northern District of California has held that
“[l]ike music and mathematical equations, computer language is just
that, language, and it communicates information either to a
computer or to those who can read it.”157 Therefore, the First
Amendment covers software. Additionally, the Sixth Circuit held
153
See also U.S. WeChat Users All. v. Trump, No. 20-cv-05910-LB, 2020 WL
5592848 at *10 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
154
Id.
155
Jason Aten, Instagram Reels Copies TikTok, and Is an Example of
Everything Wrong With Facebook, INC. (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.inc.com/
jason-aten/instagram-reels-is-a-copy-of-tiktok-an-example-of-everythingwrong-with-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/4HK2-BCZZ].
156
Complaint, supra note 6, at 2.
157
See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435–36 (N.D. Cal.
1996). See also Green v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 392 F. Supp. 3d 68, 86 (D.D.C.
2019). However, Bernstein dealt with a plaintiff professor who wished to
distribute the source code in order for people to see how computers work. In
contrast, TikTok, at the time of the first Executive Order, did not make their
source code easily accessible. Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 56, 31.
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that “because computer source code is an expressive means for the
exchange of information and ideas about computer programming, it
is protected by the First Amendment.”158
In order for TikTok’s software to receive First Amendment
protections, TikTok would need to establish that its code “possesses
sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment
into play.”159 There must be “[a]n intent to convey a particularized
message . . . and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood
was great that the message would be understood by those who
viewed it.”160 The issue with source code is that not every human
will be able to understand it because the average person is not versed
in computer programing languages. However, treating source code
as its own language, such as English or Spanish, could remedy this
problem.161 A Second Circuit opinion echoed and expanded this line
of thinking when it upheld First Amendment protections for
computer code that “convey[s] information capable of
comprehension and assessment by a human being”; however, the
court determined First Amendment protections would not apply
when “a human’s mental faculties do not intercede in executing the
instructions.”162
In the modern digital age, the First Amendment should apply to
software and the apps it powers. Although TikTok filed its lawsuit
in the Central District of California,163 the Central District will likely
find the Northern District of California’s holding, that software is
covered by the First Amendment,164 persuasive. This case, and the
existence of previously mentioned contrary precedent, could then
set the stage for Ninth Circuit review and possibly even review by
158

See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000).
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
160
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974).
161
Jorge R. Roig, Decoding First Amendment Coverage of Computer Source
Code in the Age of Youtube, Facebook, and the Arab Spring, 68 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. OF AM. L., 319, 327 (2013), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_
documents/NYU-Annual-Survey-68-2-Roig.pdf [https://perma.cc/HMK8-MGPH].
162
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 448 n.20 (2d Cir. 2001).
163
Complaint, supra note 6, at 2.
164
See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435–36 (N.D. Cal.
1996). See also Green v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 392 F. Supp. 3d 68, 86 (D.D.C.
2019).
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the Supreme Court given the high-profile nature of the case and the
national issues at stake.165 Even if software code is determined to be
protected speech under the First Amendment, the question of what
balance between freedom of speech and national security concerns
remains.
C. Balancing the First Amendment and National Security
Although the Supreme Court has not directly dealt with
balancing the First Amendment and national security in the context
of a social media app, it is important to consider judicial deference
to the executive branch when national security is at stake.166 In the
past, the Supreme Court has been incredibly deferential to the
executive branch citing national security concerns.167 For example,
in Trump v. Hawaii,168 the President had issued an Executive Order
restricting entry to the United States by individuals from eight
165

In response to TikTok’s arguments for First Amendment protection, the
Trump Administration countered that it is not regulating speech at all, but is
instead regulating business transactions through economic regulation.
Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 56, at 29. First, they argued that there
generally is no First Amendment protection concerning such transactions. Id.
Second, because the restrictions imposed by the Trump Administration are
“across-the-board” and “justified by weighty concerns of foreign policy,” there is
no First Amendment protection. Id. (quoting Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 241–
42 (1984)). Third, the D.C. Circuit has also held, in the context of common
carriers, that “such entities . . . merely facilitate the transmission of the speech of
others rather than engage in speech in their own right,” therefore, the First
Amendment does not apply to simply hosting a platform. Id. (quoting U.S.
Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 741 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). For example,
telecommunications common carriers are similar to mobile apps in that they
provide a platform and nothing more. Therefore, the D.C. Circuit opinion would
most likely cover mobile apps in the same way it covers common carriers. Id.
166
Bree Evans, The National Security Exception to the First Amendment
Prohibition on Prior Restraints, AM. UNIV. NAT’L SEC. L. BRIEF (Apr. 10, 2020,
6:41 PM), https://nationalsecuritylawbrief.com/2020/04/10/the-national-securityexception-to-the-first-amendment-prohibition-on-prior-restraints
[https://perma.cc/9USF-YLDS].
167
See Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944) (holding that it was
within the war power of Congress and the executive to exclude those of Japanese
ancestry from the West Coast because exclusion had a “definite and close
relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage”); Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 2392, 2392 (2018).
168
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2392.
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countries that might pose a national security threat.169 The Supreme
Court held that “when the President adopts ‘a preventive measure
. . . in the context of international affairs and national security,’ he
is ‘not required to conclusively link all of the pieces in the puzzle
before [courts] grant weight to [his] empirical conclusions.’”170 In a
rebuke of judicial review of the issue, the Court also held that when
“matters may implicate ‘relations with foreign powers,’ . . . such
judgments ‘are frequently of a character more appropriate to either
the Legislature or the Executive.’”171 Continuing on this note, the
Court wrote that ‘“[j]udicial inquiry into the national-security realm
raises concerns for the separation of powers’ by intruding on the
President’s constitutional responsibilities in the area of foreign
affairs.”172 And if the point was not already clear, the Court explicitly
stated, ‘“[a]ny rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the
flexibility’ of the President ‘to respond to changing world conditions
should be adopted only with the greatest caution,’ and our inquiry
into matters of . . . national security is highly constrained.”173
However, the threat to national security must be legitimate and
not merely perceived.174 The Supreme Court made this clear in New
York Times Co. v. United States175 when the Court held that the
government had not met its burden for imposing a prior restraint
when it sought to enjoin the publication of classified material
relating to the Vietnam War.176 In his concurrence, Justice Brennan
highlighted that First Amendment jurisprudence does not allow
prior restraints “predicated upon surmise or conjecture that

169

Id. at 2399.
Id. at 2409 (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 35 (2010)).
171
Id.
172
Id. at 2419 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. C.t. 1843 (2017)).
173
Id. at 2419–20 (quoting Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82 (1976)).
174
Ojan Aryanfard, National Security, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1134/national-security#:~:text
=the%20Associated%20Press)-,Despite%20the%20absolute%20
language%20of%20the%20First%20Amendment%2C%20wars%2C%20threats,
Amendment%20freedoms%20throughout%20U.S.%20history [https://perma.cc/
YUS7-YAZN] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021).
175
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 713 (1971).
176
Id. at 714.
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untoward consequences may result.”177 Justice Brennan further
explained that for the national security exception to apply, there
must be both “governmental allegation and proof that publication
must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of
an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at
sea.”178
TikTok’s situation is different from the New York Times
because the New York Times itself wished to release information it
had obtained, and the government contended the publication was a
threat to national security.179 In contrast, the national security
concern surrounding TikTok is that Chinese ownership may lead to
improper use of American data for espionage purposes because of
the structure of Chinese law.180 The thrust of the government’s
national security concerns do not concern posts on TikTok, but
rather data collection and content moderation practices.181
Because of the substantial deference towards executive action,
particularly in the context of national security, it is doubtful that a
court will find that freedom of expression on TikTok, or any other
similarly situated app, outweighs legitimate national security
concerns, mainly because it is unclear whether the content-based
restriction framework would even protect such speech. Likely, a
TikTok ban will not be considered a content-based restriction
because the entire platform would be restricted for reasons other
than the content that is posted on the platform. Therefore, such a
content-neutral ban would not be subject to prior restraint analysis.
However, even if a court determined that the ban was content-based
and subject to prior restraint analysis, the government could still ban
the app so long as the government alleges and proves that the app
will inevitably, directly and immediately cause harm to national
security.182
177

Id. at 725–26 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 726–27.
179
Id. at 714.
180
Jordan Schneider, The U.S. Is Right to Worry About TikTok, LAWFARE (Aug.
3, 2020, 2:58 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-right-worry-about-tiktok
[https://perma.cc/9ZCQ-6FY9].
181
Id.
182
See discussion supra p. 29.
178
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1. TikTok Ban as a Content-Neutral Restriction
Analyzing a TikTok ban as a content-neutral restriction also
leads to the conclusion that it is likely permissible under the First
Amendment if the government can show that banning TikTok is the
narrowest approach for achieving the significant government
interest of protecting national security. The Supreme Court has been
increasingly deferential to the executive branch in national security
matters, as can be seen in the shift of the Court’s rhetoric from the
New York Times v. United States decision to the Trump v. Hawaii
decision.183 It appears the Court may even be backing away from its
steep requirement of the government to show in definite terms how
national security is implicated. Instead, the court could defer to
executive empirical conclusions concerning issues of national
security, much like the Court’s approach in Trump v. Hawaii, in
order to allow the Executive Branch flexibility in adapting to
modern challenges. Under this deferential approach, the government
would only need some piece of evidence to support such a
conclusion and will not have to “link all the pieces of the puzzle”
before acting.184 Such deference on national security matters and the
wide availability of U.S.-owned social media apps, which leave
open other adequate channels of communication, should concern
foreign social media app owners. This concern is heightened for
Chinese owners or other countries that the U.S. government treats
similarly to China. Social media app owners should be wary of being
perceived as a national security threat in order to continue to operate
in the United States.185

183

See discussion supra pp. 28–30.
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018).
185
In U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump, the Northern District of California
issued a preliminary injunction halting the WeChat ban because the Plaintiffs had
presented serious questions of whether the ban would constitute a prior restraint
on their communication. U.S. WeChat Users All. v. Trump, No. 20-CV-05910LB, 2020 WL 5592848, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 2020). This argument turned on the fact
that WeChat is the main avenue of communication for members of the Chinesespeaking and Chinese-American community. Id. Additionally, it is one of the only
ways that Chinese-Americans can communicate with family and friends in China.
Id. This is because China has banned citizens from accessing the majority of
American social media apps. Id. This is different from TikTok because other
184
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2. Applying the Terrorism Approach to Cyber-Espionage
Another argument to consider regarding the First Amendment
and national security could be comparing cyber-espionage and
foreign terrorism. Although the government did not consider this
argument in its reply brief, it could favor the government because
courts have previously held that national security concerns outweigh
foreign terrorists’ First Amendment rights and access to social
media platforms.186 Terror organizations have previously taken
advantage of social media apps in order to spread their messages and
recruit new supporters.187 This activity draws parallels to allegations
that the Chinese government uses social media platforms to recruit
Chinese-Americans and former intelligence community members to
conduct espionage against the United States on China’s behalf.188
This is important considering that one national security concern
cited by the Congressional lawmakers regarding TikTok was that its
data collection practices would allow the Chinese government the
opportunity to build dossiers on millions of U.S. citizens.189 These
social media apps, such as Instagram and Facebook, can step in as a similar
platform that provides similar functions.
186
See Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2711 (2010).
187
Jaclyn K. Haughom, Combatting Terrorism in a Digital Age: First
Amendment Implications, FREEDOM F. INST., (Nov. 16, 2016), https://
www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-ofspeech-2/internet-first-amendment/combatting-terrorism-in-a-digital-age-firstamendment-implications/ [https://perma.cc/622A-37RX].
188
Edward Wong, How China Uses LinkedIn to Recruit Spies Abroad, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/27/world/asia/chinalinkedin-spies.html [https://perma.cc/54C6-734J]. See The Nevernight Connection,
FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/the-china-threat/clearanceholders-targeted-on-social-media-nevernight-connection [https://perma.cc/CLJ2UQB7] (last visited Oct. 21, 2020) (leading the FBI to create a warning film); Mike
Giglio, China’s Spies Are On the Offensive, ATLANTIC (Aug. 26, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/inside-us-china-espionagewar/595747/ [https://perma.cc/W78E-5MEX]. See Hammaad Salik & Zaheema
Iqbal, Social Media and National Security, GEOPOLITICS (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://thegeopolitics.com/social-media-and-national-security/ [https://perma.cc/
B5XM-EADV].
189
This could occur “in a Cambridge Analytica-style fashion, that such
information could be used to develop profiles on Americans in ways that lend
themselves to enhanced microtargeting on social media and other platforms.”
Sherman, supra note 60.
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dossiers could aid in the Chinese government’s recruitment of
Americans for espionage purposes.190
Although the executive branch likely has the power within the
legal framework to ban TikTok, the First Amendment implications
of completely banning a social media app may prove problematic.
This issue leaves open many questions concerning how the strong
government interests in national security interacts with the
competing constitutional interest of the First Amendment, and the
lack of case law on the subject may soon require courts to draw that
line.
IV. TIKTOK AS AN EXAMPLE FOR OTHER FOREIGN TECH AND
APP COMPANIES
As American and Chinese relations continue to deteriorate and
global competition, foreign policy, and national security concerns
become improperly conflated, it is more important now than ever
for international tech and app companies to prepare for the global
internet’s splintering.191 The TikTok ban could “set[ ] a precedent
for the government to ban other apps or even for other global apps
to be inaccessible to the United States’ market.”192 Companies who
wish to operate in both China and the United States may need to set
up two completely different frameworks for operating their
businesses in this new age of “net nationalism.”193
A country that engages in net nationalism “views the country’s
internet primarily as a tool of state power,” where “economic
growth, surveillance and thought control . . . are the internet’s most
important functions.”194 A classic example of what net nationalism
could lead to is the Chinese government’s “Great Firewall.”195 In

190

Id.
Gertz, supra note 76.
192
Queenie Wong et al., The TikTok saga: Everything you need to know, CNET
(Sept. 18, 2018, 7:11 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/trump-vs-tiktok-everythingyou-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/ZP8D-J6VU].
193
Wu, supra note 17.
194
Id.
195
Christopher Mims, In a U.S.-China Tech Divorce, Businesses Would Have
to Pick Sides, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
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China, websites such as Facebook, Twitter, Netflix, YouTube,
Wikipedia, and many other mainstream sites from the United States
and Europe are banned.196 Other countries have also engaged in
similar practices, including Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and India.197
A. The U.S. Clean Network Initiative and its Effects
Under the Trump Administration, the United States proposed its
version of net nationalism, the “Clean Network.”198 On a
articles/in-a-u-s-china-tech-divorce-businesses-would-have-to-pick-sides11597464037?mod=searchresults&page=4&pos=19 [https://perma.cc/WN2L-SY5V].
196
Id.
197
Id. In India, whenever there are signs of civil unrest or disturbance, various
levels of government shut the internet down. See Jeffrey Gettleman et al., India
Adopts the Tactic of Authoritarians: Shutting Down the Internet, N.Y. TIMES,
(Dec. 20, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/17/world/asia/india-internetmodi-protests.html [https://perma.cc/AK4A-HLKK]. In 2018 alone, the
government cut internet service at least 134 times. Id. Iran has likewise used the
tactic of shutting down the internet to cull protests and unrest. See Michael Safi,
Iran’s Digital Shutdown: Other Regimes ‘Will be Watching Closely,’ GUARDIAN,
(Nov. 21, 2019, 13:07), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/21/irans-digitalshutdown-other-regimes-will-be-watching-closely [https://perma.cc/AMH4-DYAV].
However, Iran has managed to cut its citizens access to global internet, while
allowing a state-backed internal network to operate even during internet
shutdowns. Id.
198
See Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, Dep’t of State,
Announcing the Expansion of the Clean Network to Safeguard America’s Assets
(Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.state.gov/announcing-the-expansion-of-the-cleannetwork-to-safeguard-americas-assets/ [https://perma.cc/7CWQ-X8TY]. The Clean
Network was first envisioned following the Prague Proposals in May 2019. See
Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary Pompeo’s Video Remarks at the Prague 5G
Security Conference 2020, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Sept. 23, 2020), https://20172021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-video-remarks-at-the-prague-5g-securityconference-2020/index.html [https://perma.cc/F9GS-9VGM]. At the Prague 5G
Security Conference, representatives from over thirty countries, the European
Unions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and industry leaders,
“participated in discussions regarding the important national security, economic,
and commercial considerations that must be part of each country’s evaluation of
5G vendors.” The Clean Network, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/theclean-network/ [https://perma.cc/P2L7-D67A] (last visited Oct. 21, 2020). The
Prague Proposals include four categories: (1) policy, (2) technology,
(3) economy, and (4) security, privacy, and resilience. PRAGUE 5G SECURITY
CONFERENCE, THE PRAGUE PROPOSALS: THE CHAIRMAN STATEMENT ON CYBER
SECURITY OF COMMUNICATION NETWORKS IN A GLOBALLY DIGITALIZED WORLD
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now-archived webpage, the U.S. Department of State’s “Clean
Network” is described as the “Trump Administration’s comprehensive
approach to guarding our citizens’ privacy and our companies’ most
sensitive information from aggressive intrusions by malign actors, such
as the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”).”199 The implementation of
the Clean Network would have meant “no Chinese apps in U.S. app
stores, no U.S. data stored on the Chinese cloud, and no U.S. apps on
Chinese smartphones.”200 How the government would have enforced
the Clean Network is unclear;201 however, the initiative highlighted a
growing trend towards net nationalism.202
The Clean Network Initiative had six goals: Clean Carrier, Clean
Store, Clean Apps, Clean Cloud, Clean Cable, and Clean Path, and
they were all antagonistic to China.203 The Clean Carrier goal would
have forbidden Chinese carriers from being connected to U.S.
telecommunications networks, reasoning that if they provided
international telecommunications services to and from the United
States, these carriers would threaten U.S. national security.204 The
Clean Store goal would have removed Chinese and other
“untrusted” apps from mobile app stores due to the threat the apps
pose to American privacy, virus proliferation, content censoring,
and propaganda and disinformation spread.205 The Clean Apps goal
intended to prevent “untrusted” Chinese phone manufacturers, such
3–5 (May 3, 2019). Highlights of these proposals include that policies governing
5G networks “should be guided by the principles of transparency and equitability,
taking into account the global economy,” and that “[s]tate-sponsored incentives,
subsidies, or financing of 5G communication networks and service providers
should respect principles of fairness, be commercially reasonable, conducted
openly and transparently, based on open market competitive principles.” Id. at 3–5.
199
Press Statement, supra note 198.
200
Id.; James Vincent, The White House’s plan to purge Chinese tech from the
internet is just bluster — for now, THE VERGE (Aug. 6, 2020, 12:45 PM), https://
www.theverge.com/2020/8/6/21356948/us-clean-network-purge-chinese-techapps-app-store-us-internet [https://perma.cc/UM4X-CG7B] (describing the
proposed program as “the US internet as it currently stands, but minus a lot of Chinese
tech”).
201
Vincent, supra note 200.
202
Wu, supra note 17.
203
The Clean Network, supra note 198.
204
Id.
205
Id.
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as Huawei, from making available or pre-installing “trusted” apps
on their app store.206 The Clean Apps goal further called for “trusted”
apps to remove themselves from “untrusted” Chinese app stores to
protect the innovation and reputation of leading U.S. and foreign
companies.207 The Clean Cloud would have “prevent[ed] U.S.
citizens’ most sensitive personal information and [U.S.] businesses’
most valuable intellectual property . . . from being stored and
processed on cloud-based systems accessible to [U.S.] foreign
adversaries . . . .”208 The Clean Cable goal would have “ensure[d] the
undersea cables connecting our country to the global internet are not
subverted for intelligence gathering” by China and would “work
with foreign partners to ensure that undersea cables around the
world aren’t similarly subject to compromise.”209 Lastly, the Clean
Path goal would have “require[d] a Clean Path for all 5G network
traffic entering and exiting U.S. diplomatic facilities.”210 The Clean
Path would have forbidden the use of “any transmission, control,
computing, or storage equipment from untrusted [information
technology] vendors, such as Huawei and ZTE . . . .”211 Again, these
companies and Chinese technologies were considered “untrusted”
by the Trump Administration because of Chinese laws which
require Chinese companies to “comply with directives of the
Chinese Communist Party.”212
Although China’s Great Firewall is the quintessential example
of “net nationalism,” some commenters suggest that the formerly
proposed U.S. “Clean Network” is better compared to Russia’s
approach to internet sovereignty.213 For instance, in Russia, “the
government has been able to pass some laws in areas like data
localization, mandating that data concerning Russian citizens is
processed in Russia, but it doesn’t have the control or resources that
206

Id. This means Huawei would not have access to “trusted” U.S. apps.
Id.
208
Id. Companies that would be affected by this include Alibaba, Baidu, China
Mobile, China Telecom, and Tencent.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Vincent, supra note 200.
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China has to directly oversee and censor the web so extensively.”214
Like the United States, the Russian government does not have the
same extensive censoring power as the Chinese government, which
is why the comparison of the Clean Network to Russian internet
sovereignty is more accurate in describing the style of net
nationalism.215
By August 2020, the United States claimed that over thirty
countries have already signed on to the “Clean Network”—
including the United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Poland, Sweden,
Estonia, Romania, Denmark, and Latvia—by choosing to allow
trusted vendors in their 5G networks.216 Examples of trusted vendors
include Telefonica, Oracle, Cisco, Telstra, Verizon, NTT, Sprint,
Jio, Telenor, Telia, AT&T, Rakuten, KDDI, T-Mobile, Taiwan
Mobile, SK Telecom, Optus, and Bell.217 The United States had
begun a high-pressure campaign of encouraging countries to reject
Huawei as their 5G provider.218 For example, the U.S. Department
of State released an op-ed encouraging Brazil to avoid Chinese
“bullying” and join the Clean Network by banning Huawei.219 The
op-ed called Huawei the “backbone of China’s worldwide
surveillance state” and also voiced concerns about China’s National
Intelligence Law, which requires companies to “turn[ ] over private

214

Id.
Id.
216
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 203. But see Leng Shumei, US Unilaterally
Put Nations on Clean Network List: Source, GLOB. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2020, 20:28),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1200334.shtml [https://perma.cc/G2JY-S6WW].
The Global Times, which is a state-run Chinese tabloid, claims that the U.S.
unilaterally put nations on the Clean Network list as a trick to put pressure on
other countries to join. Id.
217
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 203.
218
Julian E. Barnes & Adam Satariano, U.S. Campaign to Ban Huawei Overseas
Stumbles as Allies Resist, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/03/17/us/politics/huawei-ban.html?auth=login-facebook
[https://perma.cc/7W2V-K97M].
219
Keith Krach, Brazil Can Join the Growing Clean Network by Banning
Huawei, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.state.gov/Brazil-CanJoin-the-Growing-Clean-Network-by-Banning-Huawei/ [https://perma.cc/ND2XGDP7].
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citizen and business data to the Chinese government upon
request.”220
B. Sanctions as an Alternative to the Clean Network
Even without the Clean Network, the United States could still
achieve similar results through sanctions.221 For example, the United
Kingdom (“U.K.”) announced it would ban Huawei from its 5G
network after mounting pressure from the Trump Administration.222
The U.K.’s decision came after the United States placed Huawei on
the Entity List, which would require “foreign manufacturers using
American chipmaking equipment to get a license before being able
to sell semiconductors to Huawei.”223 Because of the U.S. sanctions
on Huawei, the U.K. National Cyber Security Centre launched a
review of the role of Huawei in their 5G network shortly
thereafter.224 The Centre concluded that because Huawei no longer
had access to trusted American technology, the security risk would
be too significant to continue to allow Huawei to have a presence in
the U.K.’s 5G network.225
Despite the change in presidential administrations, the effects of
the United States pushing towards some form of a “Clean Network”
would be widely felt. The move would lead to mass disruption in
the global tech industry “by leveraging the tools of international
trade.”226 For example, Chinese companies would be banned from
220
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using American software, which could lead to “hampering their
ability to sell devices in lucrative European markets.”227
Additionally, the Clean Store goal would likely lead to the sale of
more Chinese Apps to American companies to stay operative.228
This probable outcome shows that a TikTok ban may serve as an
early step in purging Chinese technology from the United States and
other western markets.
C. Movement Toward a “Splinternet”
Implementing a “Clean Network,” or other similar program,
would increase the global move toward a “Splinternet,” or fractured
internet, where the availability of certain apps and websites depends
upon geographic location.229 As more nations move towards net
nationalism and the “Splinternet” becomes more of a reality, this
shift will have large effects on international companies and how
these companies do business. Such restrictive and differing
measures could make doing business so complicated and
burdensome that the world would launch into a technological dark
age, where global connectivity would no longer be the norm. In
effect, a “Splinternet” would force companies and countries to
decide whether they want to be within the U.S. or the Chinese sphere
of internet influence.
However, a closed internet could impact some countries’
participation in the global economy, which relies on an open
internet.230 Tim Wu, the law professor that coined the term “net
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neutrality,”231 pointed out that Western countries have allowed
“Chinese censorship and blocking of content from abroad while
allowing Chinese companies to explore and exploit whatever
markets it likes. Few foreign companies are allowed to reach
Chinese citizens with ideas or services, but the world is fully open
to China’s online companies.”232 This begs the question, “[i]f China
refuses to follow the rules of the open internet, why continue to give
it access to internet markets around the world?”233
China has already responded to both the Trump
Administration’s ban on TikTok and the Administration’s “Clean
Network” initiative.234 First, China implemented its own rules
governing Chinese tech companies’ sales to foreign entities by
requiring that companies receive a license from local commerce
authorities before engaging in such a transaction.235 Additionally,
China introduced its own “Global Initiative on Data Security.”236
The Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that the initiative would
aim to encourage all countries to deal with data in ‘“a
comprehensive, objective and evidence-based manner’ and maintain
an open, secure and stable supply chain for information and
communications technology and services . . . .”237 The initiative
would also encourage countries to “respect other countries’
sovereignty in how they handle data”—a not so subtle swing at
current U.S. policy.238 China has also created an “unreliable entity

231
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list,” similar to the U.S. Commerce Department’s Entity List.239 The
list will include companies that threaten the “national sovereignty,
security or development interests of China,” along with companies
who suspend “normal transactions” or take “discriminatory
measures” against Chinese companies.240
D. The Biden Administration’s Approach
Despite the election of a new President and the dissipation of the
immediate threat of a ban (pending the Biden’s Administration’s
review), it is clear that many of the circumstances that led to the
proposed TikTok ban have not changed. In fact, the situation could
foreshadow the beginning of the end of Chinese tech in the United
States.241 There is clear bipartisan support for policies that target
China.242 The policy positions of the Republican and Democratic
2020 Presidential candidates were a good example of this.243
Leading up to the election, commentators speculated that Biden
would continue Trump’s trend of attempting “to mitigate foreign
ownership of Chinese companies in the United States.”244 The
239
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commentators took this position because both Biden and Trump
believe that “China’s been cheating, both think China has been
stealing U.S. intellectual property, both want to continue a very kind
of strong arm approach towards China.”245 When examining both
former candidates’ approaches to foreign policy, there was no real
distinction in the substance of the policy each candidate wished to
pursue regarding China.246
President Biden’s Administration has already taken steps that
seemingly confirm the commentators’ speculations. For example,
the first meeting between Chinese and U.S. officials under the Biden
Administration began with an exchange of insults between the
respective parties.247 Additionally, Biden’s Commerce Department
allowed a Trump Administration rule restricting importation of
Chinese tech to go into effect on March 22, 2021.248 Foreign tech
companies need to adjust quickly to what likely will be the new
normal.
Foreign tech companies should use TikTok as a lesson and begin
whatever mitigation they can immediately. At the very least,
companies should be prepared to work closely with CFIUS
regarding any foreign transactions that occur that could implicate
U.S. national security. Companies will likely have to engage in
extreme transparency efforts (even though it has not exactly worked
out smoothly for TikTok), especially concerning where data is
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stored and who can access that data.249 Despite the intense
competition, tech companies will likely need to work together to
develop workable solutions and best practices concerning data
security issues.250 If these companies fail to develop industry-wide
standards, the consequences will be significant, and net nationalism
will control. Implementing a “Clean Network” will force companies
to operate their businesses in dramatically different fashions, if at
all, depending on the country in which the company is located.
E. Possible Solutions
If a foreign tech company engages in any activity or association
that may be perceived as a threat to U.S. national security, then that
company should take necessary steps to mitigate that threat.
Mitigating such threats will be necessary to continue doing business
in the United States, as well as hopefully contribute to the
sustainability of the open, global internet. To begin, upon reviewing
the legal framework in place to ban apps, foreign tech companies
must take a more proactive approach in dealing with CFIUS to
counter CFIUS’ own, more active, approach. For example, if an
acquisition raises the possibility of implicating national security
concerns, any foreign company that acquires an interest in or
249

For example:
TikTok implemented several practices to mitigate the risks, including:
storing U.S. user data in the U.S. and backing it up on Singaporean
servers, blocking access to its data from its mother company ByteDance,
hiring an American CEO and operations team, beefing up its lobbying
team, withdrawing from Hong Kong based on the concerns over China’s
new national security law, launching a “transparency center” for
moderation and data practices in Los Angeles, banning political and
advocacy advertising from its platform, and setting up a global
headquarters outside of China.
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purchases a U.S. company should notify CFIUS, formally or
informally.
Some mitigation strategies aimed at lowering the threat to
national security include ensuring that only U.S. citizens have
access to critical functions and decisions of the company, imposing
independent audit requirements, and being more open to
government oversight.251 Additionally, foreign companies should
store user data on clouds and servers that are trusted “clean”
vendors. If these companies want to be exceptionally safe in the eyes
of the U.S. government, companies should not store any user data in
China. This practice would help assure the U.S. government that
American data is not accessible to foreign governments for
espionage or other purposes that may raise national security
concerns.
Additionally, companies should publish information on how
their company handles user data. This publication should include
(1) where data is stored, (2) if the company may sell data to third
parties, and (3) when companies would be required to hand over the
data to government or law enforcement authorities. Also, tech
companies should grant government and regulatory agencies access
to their code in order to test for security loopholes or concerns.
TikTok has already offered this oversight option to the Australian
government in an attempt to ease distrust, and TikTok had planned
to allow Oracle to inspect its code before negotiations were put on
pause.252
Next, companies should be exceedingly open and transparent
about their content moderation as a good faith effort to facilitate
trust. The Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and
Accountability in Content Moderation (“Santa Clara Principles”)
provide an adequate beginning framework for companies wishing to
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improve their transparency in this regard.253 The Santa Clara
Principles advise that:
Companies should publish the numbers of posts removed and accounts
permanently or temporarily suspended due to violations of their content
guidelines[,] . . . provide notice to each user whose content is taken down
or account is suspended about the reason for the removal or suspension
. . . [and] provide a meaningful opportunity for timely appeal of any
content removal or account suspension.254

Company transparency will likely foster trust between
companies, consumers, and regulating authorities. Another benefit
of company transparency and accountability is that insight would be
provided on how these companies handle misinformation, which is
another growing threat to national security.255 This transparency
could alleviate government national security concerns regarding
propaganda because it would clarify whether or not foreign
governments are inappropriately moderating information to align
with their interests.256
Lastly, tech companies should cooperatively work together to
engage foreign governments and advocate for open policies.
Although the competition is fierce among tech companies, the
253
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existence of a free and open internet where citizens from all
countries can exchange ideas is more important. Tech companies
should encourage countries to be democratic in how they handle
their citizen’s data and access to the internet and should not seek out
authoritarian policies that act purely as an Orwellian “big brother.”
Tech companies should pressure countries that do so, like China or
Iran, and encourage the United States and other Western countries
to not falter in their commitment to protect a democratic, open
internet, while understanding that there still must be a way to
address legitimate national security concerns.
V. CONCLUSION
The attempted TikTok ban has provided a valuable example of
the power available to the Executive Branch to ban a foreign
company’s operations within the United States. It has implicated the
unsettled question of whether the First Amendment applies to a
social media app that is possibly tainted with foreign control or
influence in U.S. government’s eyes. It is clear that the protection of
American data is an essential objective of the U.S. government, and
foreign companies will continuously have to adjust to persuade the
United States government that they are not a threat. As evidenced in
the possible implementation of the “Clean Network,” the move
towards net nationalism offers insight into a world that may soon
have to choose between the Chinese or the American sphere of
internet influence.
Although the foreign business and policy implications are
tremendous, a TikTok ban is more than just a legal fight. It is the
conflation of economic, trade competition, and national security
concerns that happened to come together in one of the most dramatic
ways possible. The executive branch can and will act against foreign
tech companies perceived to be a threat to national security—a
rapidly expanding category. The implications could mean a world
where what is available to users online depends on what that user’s
government has deemed appropriate. The competing spheres of the
Chinese and American internet could cripple global free markets
and trade. It is on tech to work together to address the “splintering”
of the internet and adopt workable solutions before it is too late.
TikTok might have almost been the first foreign company to fall to
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net nationalism; but, if these trends continue, it certainly will not be
the last.

